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FELONY MURDER - BURGLARY -
ENTRY WITH INTENT TO COMMIT
LARCENY.-[New Jersey] During the
evening of March 1, 1932, between
the hours of eight and ten o'clock,
little Charles A. Lindbergh, Jr., dis-
appeared from the home of his par-
ents at East Amwell, New Jersey.
In the baby's room was left a let-
ter, demanding $50,000 in ransom,
and stating that later instructions
as to the method of payment and
the return of the child would be
forthcoming. Immediately negotia-
tions were begun by the child's'
father, through one Dr. J. F. Con-
don, with supposed agents of the
child's abductors, during the course
of which the baby's sleeping suit
was sent by mail to Condon as evi-
dence that the family was "dealing
with the right parties.'" Subsequently,
on April 2, the ransom was paid, in
marked money, to a man who met
Condon in a cemetery in the Bronx,
New York. The baby was never
returned. On May 12 his body was
found in the adjoining county of
Mercer, several miles from the home
of his parents. An autopsy dis-
closed that the child had suffered
three violent fractures of the skull,
and that death had been instan-
taneous.
As a result of investigations
covering many months, the defend-
ant was arrested on October 8, 1934,
and indicted for first-degree mur-
der. The indictment charged the
killing of a human being during the
commission of a burglary. Of this
charge he was convicted and sen-
tenced to death. Held: on appeal,
affirmed. There was adequate evi-
dence to establish common-law bur-
glary and a killing resulting there-
from: State v. Hauptmann (N. J.
1935) 180 Att. 809.
This case presents an interesting
example of the problem which some-
times confronts a prosecuting officer
in drafting an indictment that will
serve the desired objective, and at
the same time fit the available
evidence.
It seems patent that, in the in-
stant case, the objective was the in-
fliction of the death penalty. Under
New Jersey law death is the pun-
ishment for those convicted of pre-
meditated murder, felony murder at
common law, or those who "in com-
mitting or attempting to commit ar-
son, burglary, rape, robbery, or
sodomy . . . shall kill another": 2
N. J. Comp. Stat. (1go) §io6, §io7.
The evidence available to the state
tended to establish (1) a breaking
and entering of the Lindbergh
home; (2) a taking of the child;
(3) the death of the child. Under
this state of the evidence, since
there was no proof of a pre-con-
ceived intent to kill the baby, the
[759]
state was forced to seek a convic-
tion of felony murder, either at
common law-which was the killing
of another during the commission
of a crime amounting to a felony,
or under the statute.
The taking of the child was kid-
napping, either at common law (See
State v. Eberling (1893) 136 Ind.
117, 119, 35 N. E. 1093), or under
the New Jersey statute: 2 N. J.
Comp. Stat. (i9io) §114. But by
statute, a killing arising out of a
kidnapping is second-, not first-de-
gree murder (Id. at §ro8) and is
punishable only by life imprison-
ment (Id. at §ri4), and at common
law, kidnapping is a misdemeanor,
not a felony: State v. Holland
(1907) 120 La. 429, 45 So. 380, 14
Ann. Cas. 692. Hence if the inflic-
tion of the death penalty, presum-
ing conviction, was the state's ob-
jective, the prosecution was forced
to contend, in view of the evidence,
that the death of the baby resulted
during the commission of a burglary
by the defendant.
Burglary, at common law, is a
breaking and entering of a dwelling
house in the night time with the in-
tent to commit a felony: 2 Whar-
ton, "Criminal Law" (1932, 12th
ed.) §968. In addition, a New Jer-
sey statute makes it a "high misde-
meanor" (equivalent to the usual
felony) to "break and enter . . .
with intent to kill, rob, steal, commit
rape, mayhem, or battery": a N. J.
Camp. Stat. (i91o) §131. Here
again the establishment of a feloni-
ous intent was necessary to a con-
viction under an indictment charg-
ing a killing arising out of a bur-
glary, and again a showing of
kidnapping' was unavailable. How-
ever, larceny, both at common law
and under the statute last quoted, is
a felonious offense. To establish that
the defendant committed larceny,
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while in the nursery of the Lind-
bergh home, would complete a case
of felony murder for the state.
The evidence tended to prove that
the defendant carried away from
the East Amwell country house (1)
the tiny infant; (2) the sleeping
suit, which the baby wore. The tak-
ing of the baby was not larceny for
two reasons: first, the taking con-
stituted kidnapping, a separate and
distinct crime; second, the first req-
uisite of larceny is that the object
taken be capable of ownership:
State v. Repp (1898) 104 Iowa 305,
73 N. W. 829, 65 Am. St. R. 463, 40
L. R. A. 678. Never in England,
and not since slavery was abolished
in the United States, has a human
being been the subject of larceny,
and even prior to that time the con-
dition of slavery had to be alleged
in an indictment charging larceny of
a slave: United States v. Godley
(1818) 25 Fed. Cas. No. 15,221, 2
Cranch C. C. 153. Consequently,
the prosecution was driven to the
anomolous position that the defend-
ant broke and entered the Lindbergh
home, in the night time, with the
intent to steal the sleeping suit of
the little child. That he also stole
the child, in taking the garment,
strictly, under the indictment, had
nothing whatever to do with his con-
viction of felony murder, except, of
course, that the death of the child
was necessary to establish the "kill-
ing of another."
Secure in the knowledge that
death resulting from a kidnapping
was not, under the laws of New
Jersey, murder in the first-degree,
counsel for the defendant argued
strenuously, on appeal, that there
was no showing at the trial below of
the common law offense of burglary,
pre-requisite to a conviction of fel-
ony murder under the indictment.
Their argument went forward on two
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grounds: (1) that the value of the
sleeping suit was not put in evi-
dence; (2) that there was no evi-
dence of an intent to steal, since the
sleeping garment was surrendered
by the defendant of his own voli-
tion.
The distinction between grand
and petit larceny, widely codified
in criminal statutes, is one that has
prevailed since the earliest days of
the common law, but it is a distinc-
tion that in no way impugns the
felonious character of the crime of
common law larceny. Long ago
Blackstone wrote that grand and
petit larceny were "offenses which
are considerably distinguished in
their punishment, but not other-
wise": Blackstone's "Commentar-
ies" (Cooley's Ed.) 229. Since bur-
glary is an offense against the home
(Id. at 223 et seq.) and not against
personal property, it would seem
that the court was clearly right in
over-ruling this contention of the
defense.
In support of the claim that the
surrender of the sleeping suit viti-
ated the larceny thereof, the defense
relied on State v. South (1859) 28
N. J. Law 28, 75 Am. Dec. 250,
which reversed a conviction of lar-
ceny on the ground that an "intent
to permanently deprive the owner of
his property must be an element in
the taking of that Property." On
the exact requirements of the rule
of lucri causa there is considerable
conflict in the decisions (See An-
notation (1921) 12 A. L. R. 804 and
cases there cited), but it would seem
that the measure set forth by Mr.
Bishop that the "true test, where
the rule of lucri causa is concerned,
is simply that he should mean some
advantage to himself, in distinction
from mischief to another: 2 Bishop
"New Criminal Law" §843," thus
adopted by the court in the instant
case, is as workable a formula as
may be developed. It has been fol-
lowed in numerous jurisdictions:
State v. McIntosh (1920) 105 Neb.
328, 180 N. W. 573, 12 A. L. R. 798;
State v. Wellman (1885) 34 Minn.
221, 25 N. W. 395; Keely v. State
(1860) 14 Ind. 36. Cf. State v.
Davis (1875) 38 N. J. Law 176, 20
Am. St. R. 367, 1 Am. Crim. R. 398;
Contra: State v. Shepherd (1901)
65 Kan. 545, 66 Pac. 236; People v.
Woodward (N. Y. 1883) 31 Hun 57;
State v. Laws (Del. 1834) 2 Harr.
529. In applying that test, the court
remarked as follows: "In the pres-
ent case the evidence pointed to use
of the sleeping suit to further the
purposes of defendant and assist
him in extorting many thousand dol-
lars from the rightful owner. True,
i" was surrendered without payment;
but, on the other hand, it was an
initial and probably essential step in
the intended extortion of money.
. . . It was well within the prov-
ince of the jury to infer that, if
Condon had refused to go on with
the preliminaries, the sleeping suit
would never have been delivered."
See principal case, p. 819.
So Hauptmann dies because he
killed a child while stealing its
sleeping suit, even though he also
kidnapped the child. In a day when
a wave of feeling against kidnap-
ping sweeps across the nation to
climax in a lynching of kidnappers
in California, this failure by the
drafters of statutes to mete the full
measure of punishment to those who
prey on children and families, and
preying, kill, is hard to condone.
That the statutory machinery of the
law should be adapted to the "war
on kidnapping" is a lesson which a
reversal on technical grounds in the
instant case would have preached
with considerable force. (For an
analysis of recent drastic changes in
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the kidnapping statutes of thirty-
one states, and the "Lindbergh
Law" see note, alsewhere in this
issue.)
HENRY I. STIMSON.
KIDNAPPING - RECENT LEGISLA-
TIoN--"LNDBERGH LAws."--Rising
public indignation over famous kid-
napping cases, which reached a peak
with the murder of Charles Lind-
bergh Jr., has manifested itself in
a flood of state and federal legis-
lation. Since 1932, thirty-one states
have revised their kidnapping laws,
some even acting at special sessions
and declaring an emergency. The
Texas legislature declared that "the
fact that it is provided under ex-
isting law that in all cases where
the person kidnapped . . . is re-
turned . '.. without serious bodily
injury having been inflicted the pun-
ishment shall be confinement in the
State penitentiary for any term of
years not less than five, and the
further fact that this penalty is
wholly inadequate to deter persons
from committing the crime of kid-
napping . . ., creates an imperative
public necessity demanding the sus-
pension of the Constitutional Rule
requiring bills to be read on three
several days . . . and this act shall
take effect . . . from and after its
passage," and provided for the
death penalty or life imprisonment
in all cases. Texas General and
Special Laws (1933) c. 1"7, §2.
While only eighteen states in-.
flicted the death penalty or life im-
prisonment prior to 1932, today
thirty-four states have so provided:
Ala., Ariz., Cal., Colo., Del., Fla.,
Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Md.,
Mass., Mich., Mo., Mont., Neb.,
Nev., N. Y., N. C., Ohio, Okla.,
Ore., Pa., S. D., Tenn., Tex., Utah,
Vt., Va,, Wash., W. Va., Wis., and
Wyo. In most cases the revision
consisted merely in providing for
more severe punishment, but a few
states have conceived more ingeni-
ous schemes for making kidnapping
an unattractive calling.
Ariz., Cal., and Neb. have fixed
the death penalty or life imprison-
ment where the victim has suffered
"bodily harm" or where there has
been "injury" or "threat of injury"
to the person: Session Laws of
Arizona (1935) p. 17; Codes, Laws
and Constitutional Amendments of
California (Deering 1935 Supp.)
§209; Compiled Stats. Neb. (1929)
c. 28, §417. Following the opinion
of the California Court in People
v. Tanner (1935) 44 P. (2d) 324,
wherein the court quoted with ap-
proval the definition of "bodily
harm" as "any touching of the per-
son of another against his will with
physical force, in an intentional,
hostile, and aggravated manner, or
projecting of such force against
his person," it was pointed out that
such a law may backfire against the
victim, who may be murdered sim-
ply to close his mouth, the criminal
knowing that he is liable to suffer
death in any case if he so much
as touches his victim: . Consulich,
"The Case Against the 'Lindbergh
Laws"' (1935) 13 The Law Stu-
dent 5. This objection is just as
pertinent against the statutes which
inflict death in all cases. Whether
or not they will make murder ap-
peal to the kidnapper as good tactics,
it is hardly to be hoped that such
laws will afford the victim much
protection.
A wiser law seems to be the New
York act, which imposes tle death
penalty or life imprisonment at the
discretion of the jury with the
proviso that if the victim is returned
alive prior to the opening of the
trial the death penalty shall not be
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imposed: Conso. Laws N. Y. (Ca-
hill's 1931-35 Supp.) c. 41, §1250;
see also Ore. Laws (1933) p. 95 and
p 452; Acts of W. Va. Leg. (2nd
extra session 1933) p. 189. If it can
be assumed that the criminal com-
mits his crimes after analytical con-
sideration of the law, it is plain
that the New York law will tend to
protect the victim, at least from
death, while the California-Texas
type of law may cause trouble, de-
pending largely on how the courts
construe it. It is to be noted that
the California court in People v.
Tanner, while quoting the definition
found in 8 C. J. 1134, did not need
to follow any such broad .interpre-
tation of the statute. For the
"bodily harm" in that case was in-
flicted by applying fire to the bound
bands of the victim.
ROBERT N. BURCHMORE.
EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY OD
BLOODY CLOTHING OF DECEASED.--
[Texas] Defendant was convicted
of murder. The bloody shirt of
the deceased was introduced into
evidence. The state's attorney in
argument to the jury remarked, at
the same time waving the bloody
shirt, "This old shirt with the life
blood of Aude Washburn (the de-
ceased) is crying out for vengeance
and justice." The demonstrations
were assigned as error. Held: on
appeal, reversed. Admission in evi-
dence of deceased's blood stained
shirt and prejudicial remarks by the
prosecuting attorney constituted re-
versible error: Garrison v. State
(Tex. Crim. App. 1935) 84 S. W.
(2d) 477.
The general rule in homicide
cases is that clothing of the deceased
is admissible in evidence at the dis-
cretion of the trial court, if it tends
to connect the accused with the
crime, prove the identity of the de-
ceased, show the nature of the
wound, or throw any relevant light
upon a material matter at issue: 2
Wharton "Criminal Evidence" (10th
ed. 1912) §518. The theory is that
ordinarily whatever the jury may
learn from descriptions given by
witnesses they may learn through
the eye from objects described:
State v. Moore (1909) 80 Kan. 232,
237, 102 Pac. 475, 477; State v.
Stair (1885) 87 Mo. 268. . Only
when it appears that the discretion
of the trial court has been abused
will the appellate court interfere
with the ruling of the lower court:
State v. Porter (1918) 276 Mo. 387,
207 S. W. 774; State v. Moore
(1909) 80 Kan. 232, 237, 102 Pac.
475, 477; Boyette v. State (1926)
215 Ala. 472, 110 So. 812; State v.
Shawley (1933) 334 Mo. 352, 67 S.
W. (2d) 74; People v. Levato
(1928) 330 Ill. 498, 161 N. E. 731.
It may be said that cases wherein
such evidence is inadmissible are
exceptions to the general rule, cre-
ated because it was felt that the
prejudicial effect of the evidence
outweighed its probative value. Of
such a character was State v. Long
(Mo. 1935) 80 S. W. (2d) 154
where the court held that the exhi-
bition of bloody clothing added
nothing to the facts established and
therefore could not have aided the
jury in arriving at the verdict. The
same conclusion was reached in
l3oyette v. State (1926) 215 Ala.
472, 110 So. 812 where the court
stated that the clothing shed no
light upon any material issue and
was but the presentation of an un-
sightly spectacle calculated to prej-
udice the jury. See also McKay v.
State (1911) 90 Neb. 63, 132 N. W.
741 in which the court said that evi-
dence which has no tendency to
either establish the guilt or inno-
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cence of the accused and which
could only serve to excite the minds
and inflame the passion of the jury
should not be admitted. The pro-
duction of real evidence should not
be permitted where it is calculated
merely to stir up passion or unduly
excite sympathy or pity and so lend
the jury to act upon sentiment in-
stead of proof. The chief objection
to the exhibition of weapons,
wounds, bloody clothing and the like
is that the jury may be led to as-
sociate the accused with the atrocity
under investigation without, suffi-
cient proof. See State v. Moore
(1909) 80 Kan. 232, 237, 102 Pac.
475, 477. This objection is treated
by Professor Wigmore in the f61-
lowing way: "No doubt such an
effect may occasionally and in an
extreme case be produced, and no
doubt the trial court has a discre-
tion to prevent the abuse of the
process; but in the vast majority of
instances where gtich objection is
made, it is frivolous and .there is
no ground foi- apprehension. Ac-
cordingly such objections have al-
most invariably'been repudiated by
the courts." 2 Wignore "Evidence"
(2d ed. 1923) §1157. An extreme
case of the admittance of demon-
strative evidence is Sloan v. Com-
nonwealth (1919) 182 Ky. 793, 207
S. W. 464 where the prosecuting at-
torney said, "The gentlemen (refer-
ring to the jury) get restless when
this bloody shirt is presented and
these blood stains remind them of
the groans of that dying fellow."
The court held that the remarks
were sort of a repartee to an un-
warranted objection on the part of
defendant's counsel. Iri the follow-
ing cases where murder was
charged, the bloody clothing was
held admissible as part of the res
gestae: Patterson v. State (1930)
23 Ala. App. 428, 126 So. 420; Corn-
mnonwealth v. Talarice (1935) 317
Pa. 481, 177 Atl. 1; People v. Bond
(1910) 13 Cal. App. 195, 109 Pac.
150; Pelfry v. Commonwealth
(1934) 215 Ky. 442, 74 S. W. (2d)
913; Langford v. State (1933) 123
Tex. Crim. 171, 58 S. W. (2d) 115.
Where the evidence of guilt is
slim, the court may feel that any
prejudicial effect is outweighed by
the probative value of the evidence.
In rape cases, the facts are apt to
be few and any real evidence which
will tend to shed light upon the com-
mission of the alleged offense is
allowed. Thus the courts have per-
mitted .the bloody clothes of the
prosecutrix to be admitted where
worn at the time of the alleged of-
fense: Long v. State (1898) 39
Tex. Crim. 461, 46 S. W. 640; State
v. Haugh (1912) 156 Iowa 639, 137
N. W. 917; Hanks v. State (1911)
88 Neb. 464, 129 N. W. 1011; State
v. Duffy (1894) 124 Mo. 1, 27 S.
W. 358.
In the final analysis the admission
of demonstrative evidence must rest
with the discretion of the trial court
and the appellate court will not re-
verse unless it feels that the trial
court has abused its discretion.
Whether or not the court in the
instant case was wise in reversing
the conviction in the face of other
proof of guilt, the bloody clothing
established nothing not already
proved by other evidence and might
well have been excluded by the
lower court, particularly since its
prejudicial effect was increased by
the inflammatory remarks of the
state's attorney.
EUGENE A. BuscH.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - FEDERAL
REGULATION OF PRISON MADE GOODS.
-[Federal] Plaintiff, a corporation
manufacturing horse collars and
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strap goods in the Kentucky State
Penitentiary, tendered to the defend-
ant railroad goods produced by
prison labor and consigned for ship-
ment to customers in various states
whose laws prohibited the sale of
prison made goods within their bor-
ders. The defendant refused to ac-
cept the shipment because of the
Ashurst-Sumners Act, which pro-
hibited the interstate shipment of
prison made goods into a state the
laws of which forbid the sale of
goods made by prison labor on the
open market. Plaintiff, alleging the
unconstitutionality of the Act,
prayed for a binding declaration of
its rights. Held: As prison made
goods are legitimate articles of
trade, there is no power in Congress
to prohibit their shipment in inter-
state commerce: Kentucky Whip
& Collar Co. v. Illinois Central Rail-
road (W. D. Kentucky, 1935) 12
F. Supp. 37.
The history of prison labor in
the United States has been charac-
terized by a struggle between organ-
ized labor, manufacturing interests,
and prison contractors, on the one
hand, who have been interested
either in the suppression or ex-
ploitation of prison labor, and pris-
on authorities and penologists on
the other hand, who have felt that
prisons could not be administered
successfully without labor under
wholesome conditions to occupy the
men's time. This struggle has been
focused on the varying systems of
prison labor, the lease system, the
contract system, the piece-price sys-
tem, the state use system, the state
account system, and the public works
and ways system-differing from
each other in their manner of pro-
duction and distribution. Produc-
tions has been either by private or
state enterprise; distribution through
the general competitive channels, or
through the state use market. The
unceasing- pressure of labor and
manufacturing interests together
with the efforts of socially minded
prison workers have resulted in the
gradual decline in the use of the
private systems of prison labor (the
lease, piece price, and contract sys-
tems), which were characterized by
exploitation and cruelty (National
Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement, No. 9 (1929) pp. 83-
89) to public control. In 1885, 74%
of prison labor were under the priv-
ate system; by 1932, the percentage
had dropped to 16%: Bureau of La-
bor Statistics (1933) 37 Monthly
Labor Review 5. In 1934, only 3,136
prisoners in but 7 states were em-
ployed under the contract system.
41 states used the state-use system,
while 24 still retained the state-
account system: State and Na-
tional Correctional Institutions of
the United States and Canada
(1935). The piece-price system is
still in use in at least 5, and possi-
bly 8, states.
This shift, however, has not been
without its costs. Despite over-as-
signment of men, short hours, and
share-the-work schemes, the propor-
tion of prisoners engaged in produc-
tive work has decreased from 75%
in 1885 to 61% in 1923, and by
1932, to only 52%: Bureau of La-
bor Statistics (1933) 37 Monthly
Labor Review 5. See 2 "Recent
Social Trends" 1169. It has been
estimated that only 25% of the pris-
oners were productively employed
in 1934: 1. V. Bennet, "Prison
Labor at the Cross-Roads" (1934)
Proceedings of the American Prison
Association, p. 242. The situation
in Illinois, while not typical, is per-
haps the most deplorable. In the
Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet,
with a total of 5,390 prisoners, only
518 were listed in 1934 as produc-
tively employed, 2,2163 were said to
be engaged in "maintenance work,"
and 2,346 were admitted to be idle:
"State and National Correctional
Institutions of the United States and
Canada" (1935). These difficulties
are greatly increased by the Hawes-
Cooper and Ashurst-Sumner Acts,
which most prison authorities be-
lieve will eventually result in the
restriction of prison labor exclu-
sively to the state use system: See
(1933) 37 Monthly Labor Review 3.
There is general agreement among
all groups that regular work for
prisoners is the sine qua non of
reformation. Manufacturing and
labor interests, however, have
strongly opposed the sale of prison
made goods on the open market on
the ground that it inevitably de-
prives free workers of employment
and depresses the standards of priv-
ate industry. This hostility has re-
sulted in the following restrictions
on prison industry: (1) stamping
goods as "prison made" (the Ash-
urst-Sumners Act, 49 U. S. C. A.
§61 et. seq., enacted in July, 1935,
prohibits the interstate shipment of
prison made goods without labels
indicating their origin). The instant
case holds this regulation constitu-
tional; (2) requirements that goods
be sold at the market price; (3)
prohibiting the use of power ma-
chinery; (4) reduction of the hours
of prison labor; (5) prohibition of
the importation of prison made
goods from foreign countries (42
Stat. 937 (1924). See Sutherland
"Criminology" (1924) p. 458. In
1929, these interests secured the pas-
sage of the Hawes-Cooper Bill,
which divests prison made goods of
their interstate character upon ar-
riVal and delivery in another state
and subjects them to the operation
of the laws of such state as though
they had been manufactured in the
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state itself. Under the Act, for ex-
ample, if Illinois wished to sell its
prison made goods in Michigan.
and Michigan prohibited the sale of
prison made goods within its bor-
ders, then the prison made goods,
after arrival and delivery in Michi-
gan, would be divested of their in-
terstate character, and pursuant to
the Michigan law, be barred from
sale. The Hawes-Cooper Act was
supplemented in July, 1935, by the
more stringent Ashurst-Sumners
Act, which prohibits the interstate
shipment of prison made goods into
a state, the laws of which forbid the
sale on the open market of prison
made goods. It is to be noted that
without supporting state legislation,
the Acts are of no avail. Urged on
vigorously by the American Federa-
tion of Labor, some 20 states by
September, 1935, have passed laws
prohibiting or regulating the sale of
prison made goods on the open mar-
ket ((1935) 41 Monthly Labor Re-
view 645), some of which go so far
as to prohibit the sale or exchange
of prison made goods amongst inter-
state prisons themselves: See Ill.
Rev Stat. (Cahill, 1933) c. 108.
§90(2); But see Consol. Laws N.
Y. (Cahill, 1931-35 Supp.) c. 21,
§69.
What are the anticipated effects
of the Acts?
(1) In 1932, prison industries
in only 18 states, totaling 35% of
all goods made in state and federal
prisons, were sold on the open mar-
ket outside the state of origin. The
legislation will principally affect
these states: H. B. Gill, Note (1932)
23 J. Crim. L. 319.
(2) It will tend toward the ex-
clusive use of the state use system.
The contract system has already been
drastically affected. See Gill, supra.
The state account system, however,
shovs surprising vitality in the face
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of the restrictive legislation. While
the number of states using this sys-
tem have dropped from 37 in 1932
to 24 in 1934, the number of pris-
oners employed has increased from
15,170 in 1932 to 15,683 in 1934:
See Bureau of Labor Statistics
(1933) 37 Monthly Labor Review
10; and "State and National Cor-
rectional Institutions of the United
States and Canada" (1935). '
(3) It will result in increased
idleness in prisons. See Gill, supra.
(4) It will cause a great reduc-
tion in the sale of prison made gar-
ments, shoes, furniture, brooms,
twine, and farm implements, most
of which are sold outside the state
of origin. See, for further analyses
of the Acts, Robinson, "Should
Prisoners Work?" (1932), and Gill,
"The Prison Labor Problem" (1931)
157 Annals of the American Aca-
demy of Political and Social Science
83.
During the ill-fated N. R. A., an
interesting experiment, unique in
prison labor history, was attempted.
After a conference of representa-
tives of 32 states was held in Wash-
ington in September, 1933 (which
later developed into the organiza-
tion of the Association of States
Signatory to the Prison Labor Com-
pact), President Roosevelt approved
a Compact of Fair Competition for
the Prison Industries: See Note
(1934) 24 J. Crim. L. 1115 for de-
tails. While the Federal Constitu-
tion provides that "no state shall,
without the consent of Congress
. . . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another state" (Art.
I, Sec. 10), the constitutional pro-
hibition "does not apply to every
possible compact or agreement be-
tween one state and another for
the validity of which the consent
of Congress must be obtained, but
the prohibition is directed to the
formation of any combination tend-
ing to the increase .of political
power in the states which may en-
croach upon or interfere with the
just supremacy of the United
States" : Virginia v. Tennessee
(1893) 148 U. S. 518, 13 S. Ct. 728.
As a prison labor compact does not
reasonably appear to "encroach upon
the just supremacy of the United
States," Congressional consent, per-
haps, was not necessary. The
President, however, under the au-
thority delegated to him by the N.
R. A. gave the "consent of Con-
gress" to the agreement by execu-
tive order. The Compact, however,
was purely voluntary, and depended
for its effectiveness on the con-
tinued enforcement of the N. R. A.,
and the recognition of the regula-
tions of the Prison Labor Authority.
When the Supreme Court decreed
the doom of the N. R. A., this set-
up collapsed, and was finally offi-
- cially abandoned in October, 1935.
Fortunately, for prison industries,
however, the Association of States
Signatory to the Prison Compact
survived. Acting under general au-
thority granted by Congress to enter
into compacts for "the prevention
of crime" (48 Stat. 909 (1934), rep-
resentatives of 14 states met in
Washington on December 2, 1935,
and reorganized the Association un-
der a new constitution. From the
discussion at the meeting, it appears
that the states plan to enter into a
more specific and legally enforcible
compact amongst themselves by se-
curing its ratification by their state
legislatures, and if necessary, by ob-
taining the consent of Congress. In
addition to the Association of the
States, another new agency is
working in the prison labor field.
In September, 1935, following the
recommendations of the Ulman
Committee (appointed by President
Roosevelt in 1934 to investigate the
operation of the Prison Labor Com-
pact), the President established the
Prison Industries Reorganization
Administration, the function of
which is to conduct surveys of pris-
on industries with the aim of for-
mulating a program for their or-
ganization under Federal aid and
guidance. With the P. I. R. A. and
a revitalized Association of States
working together, prospects of prog-
ress in the troublous prison labor
field are the brightest in many years.
The Hawes-Cooper Act and the
Ashurst-Sumners Act stand midway
between two opposing lines of cases
-cases upholding federal regula-
tion or prohibition of the interstate
shipment of "illicit articles of com-
merce," and the Child Labor deci-
sion-thus making it difficult to pre-
dict the Supreme Court's attitude to
them. Both acts have their proto-
types in the federal legislation on
intoxicating liquors. Shortly after
toe Supreme Court had held invalid
state statutes regulating the inter-
state transportation of liquor into
dry states on the theory that "a sub-
ject matter which has been con-
fided exclusively to Congress by the
Constitution is not within the juris-
diction of the police power of the
state inless placed there by Con-
gressional action" (Leisy v. Hard-
ing (1890) 135 U. S. 100, 10 S. Ct.
681; Bowman v. Chicago North-
western Railroad (1888) 125 U. S.
465, 8 S. Ct. 689); Congress passed
the Wilson Act, which divested
liqour of its interstate character and
subjected it to the operation of
state laws. In the case of In re
Rahrer (1891) 140 U. S. 545, 11 S.
Ct. 865, the court held that since
Congressional assent had now been
given, interstate commerce to the
extent covered by the Wilson Act
was subject to state regulation. In
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1913, Congress passed the Webb-
Kenyon Act (the progenitor of.the
Ashurst-Sumners Act) which went
much further than the Wilson Act,
prohibiting the shipment of liquor
into a state to be received, used or
sold in violation of the state law.
In Clark Distilling Co. v. Western
Maryland Railroad Co. (1917) 242
U. S. 311, 37 S. Ct. 180 the Court
dismissed the contention that the
Act unlawfully delegated power to
the states in divesting goods of their
interstate commerce character, and
held, that since Congress could com-
pletely prohibit the shipment of
liquor- into interstate commerce
(Champion v. Ames (1902) 188 U.
S. 321, 23 S. Ct. 321; Hoke v. United
States (1912) 227 U. S. 30, 33 S.
Ct. 281), the exercise of the divest-
ing power-a lesser power-was
valid. See Black, "The Significance
of the Divesting Theory in the Reg-
ulation of Milk (1935) 23 Ky. L. J.
589, 596.
On the basis of the decisions
represented by these liquor cases,
and decisions sustaining other fed-
eral prohibitory legislation (see
Corwin, "Congress's Power to Pro-
hibit Commerce" (1933) 18 Corn. L.
Q. 477, 478, for a complete list of
the statutes and decisions), it was
thought that the Child Labor Law,
which prohibited the shipment in
interstate commerce of the products
of child labor, was constitutional,
but the Supreme Court, in Hammer
v. Dagenhart (1918) 247 U. S. 251,
38 S. Ct. 529, drew their much
criticized distinction between the
power to regulate commodities dan-
gerous to the health and .welfare
of the people, and commodities
which in and of themselves are
harmless, and held the Act uncon-
stitutional. As prison made goods
are identical in this respect with
goods made by child labor, it has
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been contended that the Hawes-
Cooper and Ashurst-Sumners Acts
are also invalid. The instant case
so holds: See also Davis, "The
Hawes-Cooper Act Unconstitution-
al" (1930) 23 Lawyer and Banker
296. In State v. Whitfield (Wis.
1934) 257 N. W. 601, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court held the
Hawes-Cooper Act constitutional.
In Whitfield v. State (Ohio, 1935)
197 N. E. 605, the Court of Appeals
of Ohio sustained state legislation
enacted in pursuance of the Hawes-
Cooper Act. If the Supreme Court
upholds the federal legislation, the
constitutionality of the state legis-
lation supplementing it seems as-
sured. See Plumley v. Massachu-
setts (1894) 155 U. S.'461, 15 S. Ct.
154, where the Supreme Court up-
held a state statute prohibiting the
sale of colored oleomargarine.
It is submitted for the following
reasons that the Supreme Court will
not adopt the view toward the fed-
eral legislation on prison made goods
taken in the instant case:
(1) There is a significant dis-
tinction between the blanket prohi-
bition of the shipment of goods in
interstate commerce in the Child
Labor legislation, and the power to
prohibit the shipment of such goods
into a state in violation. of the laws
of that state. In the first instance
and as the Court held in the Child
Labor case, the legislation may be
regarded as an invasion of the re-
served powers of the, state under
the Tenth, Amendment. In legisla-
tion based on the divesting theory,
however, the Congressional power
is exercised in supplement and sup-
port of state legislation, and thus
can hardly be said to invade the
rights of the state. See Massachu-
setts v. Mellon (1923) 262 U. S. 447.
43 S. Ct. 59.
(2) The strict logic of the Child
Labor case has been directly im-
paired by the decision in United
States v. Brooks (1924) 267 U. S.
432, 45 S. Ct. 345, sustaining the
Dyer Act, which prohibited the
transportation in interstate com-
merce of stolen automobiles. The
Court found that stolen automobiles
were illicit subjects of commerce,
but the illicitness of stolen automo-
biles does not arise from the nature
of the article itself, but springs
from "an infection from the source
of the subject of transportation."
(Corwin, supra at 480.) This, too,
was the situation in the Child Labor
case.
The instant case, with little at-
tempt at analysis, and without cit-
ing a single decision in support of
its opinion, has cavalierly disposed
of the Ashurst-Sumner Act. For
the reasons advanced above, it is
believed that the Supreme Court
will adopt a contrary view and sus-
tain the constitutionality of the
legislation.
MAURTCE C. KAPLAN.
